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ABSTRACT
This study examines the effects of government spending shocks
in three Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries: the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland. The article uses structural vector
autoregression (SVAR) models with an identification scheme based
on that of Blanchard and Perotti (2002). The results of government
spending shocks in these countries are consistent with the general
view that the spending innovation increases output in the short
term. The impulse response functions show that the maximum
response of output to spending shocks is lagged. In order to
measure the effects of fiscal shocks, the peak and cumulative mul-
tipliers are calculated. In the baseline specification, which is the
same for each country, the calculated peak spending multiplier
(adjusted to be interpreted in the national currency) ranges from
0.2 in the Czech Republic to more than 1 in Poland. The response
of GDP to spending shock is larger than 1 cumulatively.
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In recent years, the importance of fiscal policy in many European Union countries has
emerged due to several specific issues. One of these is related to the Great Recession
period, which was associated with the weak stabilisation effects of monetary policy
tools; especially the ineffectiveness of many central banks’ conventional policy. In tur-
bulent times, the discretionary measures of fiscal policy were conducted as the main
elements of reducing the macroeconomic imbalances. As a result, many studies have
tried to assess the effects of fiscal expansion on economic activity, including the assess-
ment of the stabilising role of government spending. This analysis is also crucial for the
European Union countries outside the eurozone. The importance of this research is
derived from the role of fiscal policy as one of the most important macroeconomic
tools to cope with the asymmetric shock that occurred inside the eurozone. The need
to analyse the effects of government spending also arises due to the importance of
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spending tools in conducting fiscal policy (see e.g., Sekuła & Smiechowicz, 2016, pre-
senting the importance of spending transfers to local governments).
The effects of fiscal policy are evaluated in many studies. Some of them propose to
analyse the outcomes of fiscal policy on the macroeconomic system by employing the
New Keynesian models (e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum, & Rebelo, 2011; Eggertsson,
2011; Woodford, 2011), or using the vector autoregression (VAR) framework (e.g.,
Blanchard & Perotti, 2002; Caldara & Kamps, 2008; Mountford & Uhlig, 2009;
Perotti, 2005), a narrative approach (Favero & Giavazzi, 2012; Mertens & Ravn, 2012;
Ramey, 2011; Romer & Romer, 2010), or an experimental ‘bucket approach’ (e.g.,
Batini, Eyraud, & Weber, 2014). The literature provides many examples of measure-
ment of the impact of these effects, especially in the form of fiscal multipliers. It also
points out the sensitivity of multiplier estimations depending on the analytical tool
used; the time of the sample under consideration; the analysed country or group of
countries; the structure of the economies; and many other factors strongly associated
with the macroeconomic settings of analysed countries (see for example Eggertsson,
2011; Erceg & Linde, 2014; Gechert, 2015; Gechert & Rannenberg, 2014; Hemming,
Kell, & Mahfouz, 2002; Ilzetzki, Mendoza, & Vegh, 2013; Kraay, 2014; Spilimbergo,
Symansky, & Schindler, 2009). Generally, the estimated (mainly within the neoclas-
sical framework) pre-crisis spending multiplier is not higher than 1. However, under
specific circumstances, mainly in the recession period, the value of the multiplier may
be higher than 1 or even higher than 2 (e.g., Christiano et al., 2011; Eggertsson, 2011;
Hall, 2009). The significant difference in the value of the spending multiplier between
periods of recession and expansion was demonstrated by Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012), and also in many studies employing the New Keynesian mod-
els that are restricted to assumptions about the monetary accommodation, liquidity
trap, or binding zero lower bound on nominal interest rates (see e.g., Christiano
et al., 2011; Coenen at al., 2012 or Erceg & Linde, 2014; Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, &
Wieland, 2010).
The aim of the present study is to analyse and compare effects of government
spending shocks in three Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries outside the
eurozone: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The importance of the analysis
arises from many reasons. The study provides a comparable analysis for three non-
eurozone members which joined the European Union in May 2004. The examples of
the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary are crucial because they entered the
European Union in 2004 together with seven other countries (Slovakia, Slovenia,
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Malta and Cyprus). However, as of today, only these three
studied countries (out of 10 mentioned) remain outside the eurozone.
In this study, we propose to analyse the effects of government spending shocks
within the system of a three-variable SVAR model. The system includes GDP, net
taxes and government spending. The identification scheme follows the Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) approach. The SVAR model predicts that a positive government
spending shock provides a positive response of output. In our study we investigate
the effects of spending shocks on three CEE countries, and compare the strength and
significance of this impact in countries with the same period of membership in the
EU. The literature provides some papers that examine the effects of government
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spending in a single or a group of CEE countries (Baranowski, Krajewski,
Mackiewicz, & Szymanska, 2016; Crespo Cuaresma, Eller, & Mehrotra, 2011; Haug,
JeRdrzejowicz, & Sznajderska, 2013; Grdovic Gnip, 2014; Lendvai, 2007; Mirdala, 2009,
among others). This article provides a comparative analysis of government spending
shocks in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, based on the same methodology
and the same data source for each country. The article differs from existing studies
by calculating fiscal multipliers in a time-span that includes the latest crisis period
(from the first decade of the twenty-first century), and it provides some robustness
checks. Taking into account the significance of fiscal policy as a tool to cope with the
asymmetric shocks in the eurozone, the obtained results provide contributions to the
literature concerning the effects of fiscal shocks in three CEE countries that are candi-
dates for joining the euro area.
The structure of the article is as follows. The second section presents a short litera-
ture review relating to the macroeconomic effects of spending shocks within VAR
models. The two subsequent sections provide the methodology and data, respectively.
In Section 5, the results for the baseline model and the robustness checks are pre-
sented. The last section of the article provides the main conclusions and some
implications.
2. A brief literature review of the empirical evidence
of the effects of government spending shocks
The empirical research on measuring spending multipliers is dominated by the VAR
framework. In VAR literature, the alternative approaches to spending multiplier cal-
culations are distinguished depending on the identification scheme or variables
included in the system. The main identification schemes are based on the recursive
approach and its modification (Fatas & Mihov, 2001; Blanchard & Perotti, 2002); the
narrative approach (Ramey & Shapiro, 1998); or sign restrictions (Mountford &
Uhlig, 2009). An empirical verification of some of these approaches to shock factor-
isation is investigated by Caldara and Kamps (2008, 2017), among others.
The paper by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) analyses the effects of spending and
revenue shocks in the U.S. during the post-war period. The proposed identification is
based on institutional information about the tax and transfer systems, including the
lags in fiscal policy, which are associated with the SVAR framework. Their SVAR
approach was modified by Perotti (2005), and it was used in many studies (e.g.,
Baum & Koester, 2011; Caldara & Kamps, 2008, 2012; Monacelli & Perotti, 2008).
The recursive approach and Cholesky decomposition are not commonly used for the
fragmentation of fiscal shocks, due to the problems with ordering. However, the work
by Fatas and Mihov (2001) modifies this identification to provide the ‘test’ for out-
comes obtained from the neoclassical model. It is also employed by Afonso and Silva
Leal (2018) to analyse the effects of fiscal shocks in the eurozone. The work by
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) proposes to analyse the effects of spending and tax
shocks within the sign restrictions imposed on the impulse response functions and it
was derived from the analysis of monetary policy shocks provided by Uhlig (2005).
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During the last decade, a large increase has been observed in the empirical assess-
ment of the effects of government spending shocks, based on the VAR techniques.
The former analyses have been mainly applied to advanced countries like the U.S.
(Blanchard & Perotti, 2002; Fatas & Mihov, 2001; Mountford & Uhlig, 2009; Perotti,
2005), Germany (e.g., Baum & Koester, 2011; Perotti, 2005; Tenhofen, Wolff, and
Heppke-Falk, 2010) or France (Biau & Girard, 2005, among others). Now, there is a
growing number of studies analysing the effects of spending shocks in developing
countries, the ‘new’ European Union Member States or Balkan countries (e.g., Coric,
Simovic, & Deskar-Skrbic, 2015; Crespo Cuaresma et al., 2011; Deskar-Skribic &
Simovic, 2017; Hinic & Miletic, 2013; Ravnik & Zilic, 2011).
The latest analyses include many modifications of the VAR framework in order to
capture the state-dependent effects. For example, Baum and Koester (2011), Batini,
Callegari, and Melina (2012), and Mirdala and Kamenik (2017) use the threshold
VAR approach to confirm the higher effects of spending shocks in recession than in
expansion. The works by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) or Bencık (2014)
employ the smooth transition VAR approach and reach the same conclusion: the
effects of fiscal shocks are greater in ‘bad times’ than in ‘good times’. Many of these
works identify regimes by the level of the output gap or GDP growth rate. However,
for example, Afonso, Baxa, and Slavik (2018) distinguish between regimes by taking
into account the stress on the financial market, whereas Owyang, Ramey, and
Zubairy (2013) separate them on the basis of unemployment rate.
The SVAR framework is also used by Deskar-Skrbic, Drezgic, and Simovic (2018)
to analyse the impact of tax wedge on employment in Croatia, and by Simovic (2017)
to assess the influence of public debt on effects of fiscal policy in Croatia.
Finally, it should be pointed out that SVAR models may fail to correctly estimate
the response of output to the spending shocks and, in fact, might over- or under-esti-
mate the value of multipliers. This problem, as well as problem known as fiscal fore-
sight, may lead to biased results. The role of fiscal foresight and the identification of
unanticipated tax shocks was debated by Ramey (2011), Mertens and Ravn (2012) or
Forni and Gambetti (2016), among others. The literature review also finds some scep-
ticism regarding the use of SVAR as a good analytical tool for calculating the effects
of fiscal policy on macroeconomic settings. Such arguments are presented by Ramey
and Zubairy (2018) or Mertens and Ravn (2014), among others. Furthermore,
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) suggest that the SVAR model may provide
biased results when analysing the impact of tax innovations, due to the fact that the
tax elasticities may possibly change over the cycle. Moreover, Caldara and Kamps
(2012, 2017) indicate that different approaches to identification schemes in VARs
may lead to different outcomes; they build their findings on the example of the
U.S. economy.
3. Methodology
In this study, the empirical assessment of the effects of fiscal policy shock is based on
the SVAR approach. The identification of the fiscal shocks follows the Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) scheme. The core idea of this identification is based on the
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assumption that fiscal variables cannot react, within the same quarter, to changes in
macroeconomic background. The employed approach predicts a positive response of
output to a positive spending shock.
The fiscal SVAR in this study includes three variables: government spending, net taxes
and GDP. The spending variable and net taxes variable are defined similarly to Blanchard
and Perotti (2002): i.e., government spending (Gt) consists of the sum of government con-
sumption and government investments, whereas net taxes (RtÞ are defined as general tax
revenues reduced by certain transfers (information about the data is presented in the next
section). In the article, a separate model for each country is investigated.




CjXtj þ Bvt (1)




CjXtj þ ut (2)




A1CjXtj þ A1Bvt (3)
where Xt is the vector of endogenous variables and Xt ¼ Gt Yt Rt
 0
, Rt denotes
net taxes, Gt denotes government spending, Yt is GDP. All mentioned variables are
presented as logarithms. Additionally, Cj and A are three-dimensional matrices of
parameters, vt is a vector of structural shocks and vt  Nð0, BEðvt m0tÞB0), k
denotes the order of lags in the model. Moreover, each of the models includes the
vector of constants, time trend and a dummy variable ‘crisis’ for the crisis and post-
crisis period.
In order to achieve identification of the structural shocks, the AB representation
was employed (L€utkepohl, 2005). It gives the following relation: Aut ¼ Bmt, where ut
represents the reduced-form residuals. The AB representation allows the preparation
of identification. Taking into account the Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the restric-
tions for each of these two matrices have been imposed. The initial elements of the



































The diagonal elements of matrix A were restricted to 1. The value of the parameter
a7 was restricted to 0, because of the assumption that the analysed spending (public
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investment and public consumption) does not react within the same quarter to out-
put; this assumption follows Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Parameters a4 and a5 illus-
trate the relations of Gt and Rt to output, respectively. The parameter a6 represents
the elasticity of net taxes. It was calculated exogenously, based on the partial elasticity
of selected taxes and transfers to output, as provided by the IMF (2017). The value of
the elasticity for each model is presented in the relevant tables in the Appendix. The
diagonal elements of matrix B were estimated within the model. Moreover, the param-
eter b5 was set to 0 and the parameter b4 was not restricted; this method imposed
the assumption that the government spending was ordered first. In other words, the
spending decisions come first, meaning that when the government increases taxes and
spending within the same quarter, taxes respond to the increase in spending.
4. Data
This article analyses the impact of fiscal policy shocks in three countries: the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland. In order to compare results, our estimation was based
on comparable datasets. All data came from the Eurostat database, based on
ESA2010, and the frequency of the used data was quarterly. The employment of quar-
terly data, as argued by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), has many advantages in the
identification scheme, due to the assumption that the policymaker (the government)
cannot react to changes in the macroeconomic background within one quarter. The
time series for all data for the Czech Republic and Hungary were available for the
period 1999q1–2018q1. The data for Poland covered the period 2002q1–2018q1. Taking
into account the goal of the study, our models were estimated on the same time sam-
ple. Finally, the data used in this article covered the period of 2002q1–2018q1 in the
case of each country.
Fiscal data and GDP data were expressed in million units of national currency and
presented in constant prices (deflated by the GDP deflator index 2010¼ 100). Fiscal
data covered the general government sector. The definition of spending followed
Blanchard and Perotti (2002): government spending (Gt) consisted of the sum of gov-
ernment consumption and government investments. In the baseline models, the net
taxes were defined as total revenues reduced by the value of the market output, and
reduced by transfers, subsidies and interest payments (similar to Borg, 2014; Mirdala
& Kamenik, 2017, among others).
Fiscal variables and GDP were seasonally adjusted using the TRAMO/SEATS
method. Moreover, the variables were presented in natural logarithms.
The models include the dummy variable ‘crisis’,1 the value of which equals 1
after 2008q3 (similar to Haug et al., 2013; Simovic & Deskar-Skrbic, 2013, among
others). It reflects the potential effects of a negative output gap in the eurozone during
the last crisis and post-crisis period (see: Sz€orfi & Toth, 2018). The elasticities of taxes
were calculated on the basis of the IMF (2017), which provides the assessment of par-
tial elasticities of fiscal aggregates. It was assumed that the same source of exogenous
elasticities ensures the similarity of calculations and reduces the bias arising from dif-
ferent calculation methodologies. However, the calculations of elasticities were lower
than those adopted in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) or Perotti (2005) for the U.S.
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The ADF and Phillips–Perron tests of unit roots showed the non-stationarity
of variables in levels (see Table A1 in the Appendix). However, although the
Phillips–Perron test suggests the system is stationary in first differences, each of the
SVAR models is estimated using variables in levels, according to the results of Sims,
Stock and Watson (1990) and Sims (1980). In other words, the aim of the VAR
model is to determine the relations between variables (and focus on dynamic interac-
tions), instead of determining the estimation of the model’s parameters. Moreover,
Canova (2007) argues that estimating the VAR model in levels is possible even if the
unit root tests suggest the non-stationarity in time series. From this point of view,
Mountford and Uhlig (2009), for example, estimate the model in levels. Data in levels
are important for analysing effects obtained from impulse response functions (see
Tenhofen et al., 2010). The fiscal SVAR with data in levels (in log representation) are
analysed by Giordano, Momigliano, Neri, and Perotti (2007), Grdovic Gnip (2014),
Baranowski et al. (2016), among others.
5. Empirical results
This section presents results for the baseline models, mainly concerning the impulse
response functions and calculations of the spending multiplier.
First, the lag length for the three baseline models was tested. Results are shown in
Table A2 of the Appendix. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) suggests 1 lag in
the case of the models for Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. The same num-
ber of lags is suggested by the Schwarz (SIC) information criterion and the Hannan-
Quinn (HQC) information criterion. When 1 lag was employed in each model, then,
taking into account the VAR specification, all unit roots fell within the unit circle.
This suggests the stability of each of the models. Because the SIC, HQC and AIC cri-
teria indicate the same number of lags (i.e., 1) for all countries, it was decided to esti-
mate our VAR models with 1 lag. This approach has several advantages: firstly, it
allows a comparison of the effects of fiscal shocks over the same sample and within
the models with the same number of lags; secondly, it ensures the stability of each
model (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). Moreover, the use of 1 lag allows us to con-
clude that our reduced-form specifications ensure the absence of autocorrelation.
The restrictions imposed on the A and B matrices guarantee that our models are
just-identified (see L€utkepohl, 2005). Finally, we can analyse impulse response func-
tions and draw conclusions on the effects of spending shocks.
Table A3 in the Appendix shows the estimation of parameters for each baseline
model. In the baseline specifications, the following values for parameter a6 in A
matrix were imposed: 0.96 for the Czech Republic, 0.98 for Hungary, and 1.15 for
Poland. The impulse response functions of Y variable to structural 1 s.d. shock in G are
illustrated in Figure A2 in the Appendix; the dashed lines represent the 2 s.e. band. The
figure shows that, taking into account the model specification, the reaction is positive
and expires faster over the analysed horizon in the cases of Hungary and the Czech
Republic. The response of Y variable to G shock is the highest in Poland, and the low-
est in the Czech Republic. The models for Poland and the Czech Republic show that
the maximum reaction to spending shock is more lagged in comparison to the
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response in Hungary (in Hungary it was in the 2nd quarter, in the Czech Republic in
the 4th quarter, and in the case of Poland in the 7th quarter). The impact of spending
on GDP is more persistent in Poland. The effects of spending shock were also analysed
by considering the cumulative multipliers. The estimation of cumulative multipliers fol-
lows Hinic and Miletic (2013), among others. It shows the cumulative change in output
over the cumulative change in spending at some time horizon. Table 1 below presents
the cumulative multipliers after the 4th, 8th and 16th quarters. It also includes the cal-
culation of the peak multiplier, based on the maximum response of the output within
the horizon to shock in government spending at the time of impact. The presented
multipliers are adjusted to be interpreted in the national currency.
The cumulative multipliers capture the cumulative reaction of output to cumulative
change in G at specified horizons. The presented results indicate the highest cumulative
output effects after 4 quarters in Poland; whereas, over the whole 16-quarter horizon,
the highest cumulative output effect also appears in Poland. This denotes the more per-
sistent effects of spending shock on the Polish economy, calculated within the analysed
system. The analysis of the SVAR estimation’s development path of the cumulative
multiplier indicates a lower range of changes in the case of the model for Poland. In
the Czech Republic, the estimation of the multiplier after four years is nearly three
times higher than after the first year, whereas in Poland it is only 1.2 times higher.
The robustness checks of our analysis were provided by changing the frameworks of
the system. At first, the different tax measures were employed through disaggregating
the tax data. First, taxes on income and wealth were considered as an approximation of
direct taxes. However, the difference between these types of taxes and transfers was
negative for most of quarterly observations in our sample, and as a result, the tax vari-
able cannot be transformed into log representation. Consequently, the tax variable (not
reduced by social transfers, subsidies and interest payments) was entered into the system.
Then the appropriate tax elasticities were recalculated and incorporated within each
model. The lag structure for the new models was tested, wherein the maximum number
of 4 lags was assumed. The use of the SIC criterion indicated the importance of 1 lag in
SVARs for each country (on the contrary, the AIC criterion suggested 4 lags in the
model for Poland and that for Hungary, with only 1 lag in the Czech Republic’s model).
However, the use of 1 lag in the model with direct taxes for Poland was not satisfactory
from the point of view of the quality of residuals (due to autocorrelation). As a result,
the decision about the model extension was made up to maximum number of lags (i.e.,
4). When the model with 4 lags was built for Poland, then the test was not rejected.2
The same procedure was repeated for models with indirect taxes (treated as an
Table 1. Spending multipliers: baseline model with k¼ 1 lag.
Cumulative multiplier after quarter
Peak multiplier4th 8th 16th
Czech Republic 0.3690 0.7379 1.2089 0.1550 (4)
Hungary 0.5415 0.8167 1.0200 0.3041 (2)
Poland 1.4638 1.6931 1.8299 1.7610 (7)
Notes: In the case of the peak multiplier, the sign  denotes the significance of the calculation based on the error
bands. The number in brackets denotes the quarter with the maximum response. The calculation of the cumulative
multiplier is based on the accumulated responses, whereas the calculation of the peak multiplier is based on the
responses of Y to the initial one standard deviation shock in G.
Source: Author’s own calculations.
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approximation of taxes on production and imports). The estimated coefficients of A and
B matrices are presented in Table A4 and Table A6 in the Appendix; the impulse
response functions are illustrated in Figure A3 and Figure A5 in the Appendix. As inves-
tigated, the shapes of obtained impulse response functions are quite similar to those of
the baseline models. The error bands indicate the non-significant response of output to
spending shock in the Czech Republic. The maximum response of Y to G shock is
lagged in the case of each country. The peak multipliers calculated for Hungary in mod-
els with direct or indirect taxes are higher than in the baseline model, whereas calcula-
tions for the Czech Republic present similar values of multipliers (compare Table 1 in
the article and Table A10 in the Appendix). In the case of Poland, the peak multiplier
for the baseline model is similar to the peak spending multiplier calculated for the model
with indirect taxes; also, the quarter with the peak response is the same in both models
(although in the case of Poland, due to presented problems with autocorrelation of the
residuals, the model with 1 lag was not calculated for the system with direct taxes).
In order to compare effects of spending innovations in models with 4 lags, the add-
itional analysis was prepared. The results for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
are presented in Table A5 and Table A7 and Figure A4 and Figure A6 in the
Appendix. Due to problems with the quality of the SVAR model in relation to indirect
taxes, the calculations for Hungary were not presented. The peak multipliers (adjusted
to be interpreted in the national currency) are reported, as previously, in Table A10.
In the study, models with 4 lags in the baseline representation were also investi-
gated. The impulse response functions for Y variable are illustrated in Figure A7 in
the Appendix (Table A8 in the Appendix includes the elements of A and B matrices).
As presented, the inclusion of 4 lags provides a more significant reaction of Y to the
structural one standard deviation shock in G. The calculated peak multipliers are
higher than in the baseline model, even if the same system of variables is analysed
(see Table A10 in the Appendix). The obtained outcome is consistent with the con-
clusions provided in Capek and Crespo Cuaresma (2018), in that the peak multiplier
calculated in the SVAR model with 4 lags is higher than that calculated in a similar
model with a lower number of lags. Table 2 below presents the cumulative multipliers
estimated for extended models. These models are stable (all unit roots are inside the
unit circle). The calculation of multipliers follows the same procedure, as previously.
Finally, the investigation of whether the response of Y to G shock depends on the
period of analysis was conducted. Although the sample under consideration is quite
short, the decision to extract the ‘turbulent times’ was made. As a result, the baseline
Table 2. Spending multipliers: baseline model with k¼ 4 lags.
Cumulative multiplier after quarter
Peak multiplier4th 8th 16th
Czech Republic 0.3409 0.8582 1.4356 0.2430 (6)
Hungary 0.6462 1.0319 1.5827 0.6725 (3)
Poland 1.2456 1.5969 1.8798 2.2880 (7)
Notes: In the case of the peak multiplier, the sign  denotes the significance of the calculation based on the error
bands. The number in brackets denotes the quarter with the maximum response. The calculation of the cumulative
multiplier is based on the accumulated responses, whereas the calculation of the peak multiplier is based on the
responses of Y to the initial one standard deviation shock in G.
Source: Author’s own calculations.
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sample was shortened to a sample covering the period since 2007, i.e., the period
with serious macroeconomic turbulences (including a crisis period) in many coun-
tries; this division is similar to that in Mirdala and Kamenik (2017). The lag length
test, based again on the SIC criterion, indicates the inclusion of 1 lag in the case of
each country. The implication of 1 lag ensures the stability of each model. Taking
into account the model specifications (without the ‘crisis’ dummy variable) and the
same values of tax elasticities as those incorporated into the baseline model, the
impulse response functions were obtainable only for Hungary and Poland (see
Figure A8 and Table A9 in the Appendix). In the case of the Czech Republic, the
analysis based on the same assumptions and exogenous elasticities did not allow the
estimation of satisfactory parameters of the A and B matrices.3 In these two coun-
tries, the maximum response is lagged: in Poland it occurs after the 2nd quarter,
whereas in the case of Hungary after the 7th quarter. The value of the peak multi-
pliers is presented in Table A10 of the Appendix. Due to the quite short sample,
problems with obtaining satisfactory results for the pre-crisis sample occurred: the
analysis based on the same assumptions and exogenous elasticities did not allow the
estimation of satisfactory parameters of the A and B matrices4 or did not ensure
the good quality of the residuals.
The analysis of the calculated multipliers and the observation of impulse response
functions (error bands) indicate that the results for Poland were not satisfactory.
Subsequently, the models for Poland were re-estimated. The new specification
includes, as previously, the same variables and the trend variable, but without the
dummy variable for the crisis and post-crisis period. The new elements of A and B
matrices are presented in Table A11 in the Appendix, while Figure A9 in the
Appendix shows impulse response functions for Poland. As presented in Table 3
below, the SVAR specification without the ‘crisis’ dummy variable leads to lower
peak multipliers. However, their values are still higher than 1.
The literature review provides results for multipliers in other CEE countries. For
instance, Grdovic Gnip (2014) received a cumulative spending multiplier for Croatia
that was equal to 1.84 after 12 quarters, and 2.66 after 20 quarters. Mirdala (2009)
reported a positive response of GDP to government spending shock for the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and the Slovak Republic. Haug et al.
(2013) in their SVAR for Poland (1998q1–2012q4) calculated spending multipliers
lower than those in our study: the estimated values range between 0.14 after the first
quarter to 0.48 after 12 quarters (peak multiplier). Lendvai’s (2007) work shows a
negative response of GDP to expansionary spending shock in Hungary (SVAR
estimated for the period 1997q1–2005q4).



















1.21 (3) 1.80 (7) 1.08 (3) 2.00 (7) 1.29 (2) 2.06 (6)
Notes:  denotes the significance of the calculation based on the error bands. The number in brackets denotes the
quarter with the maximum response.
Source: Author’s own calculations.
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However, in the light of the literature, the obtained results are quite similar to calcu-
lations of spending multiplier for the eurozone countries. For example, Afonso and
Silva Leal (2018) in their baseline SVAR calculate the accumulated spending multiplier
(for primary expenditure) as equal to 0.64 after 4 quarters and 1.10 after 8 quarters
(the sample covers 2001q1–2016q4, composed of 19 eurozone countries with dummy
variables related to their membership). The short-term multiplier in Burriel et al.
(2010) study of the eurozone is calculated as 0.87. In Borg’s (2014) study, the cumula-
tive spending multiplier for Malta reaches 1.0 in the 4th quarter and 1.2 in the 8th
quarter after shock. Perotti (2005) obtains the cumulative GDP response to spending
shock in the 4th quarter as equal to 0.4 in Germany, whereas the spending multipliers
calculated by Tenhofen et al. (2010) are: 0.83 on impact, 0.58 after 4 quarters, 0.4 after
8 quarters, and close to zero after 12 quarters (however, these two works do not cover
a sample that includes the latest crisis period). The short-term cumulative spending
multiplier calculated by de Castro Fernandez and Hernandez de Cos (2006) for Spain
is higher than 1 (the value is 1.31), whereas it decreases to 0.26 after 20 quarters.
Finally, as presented by Mineshima, Poplawski-Ribeiro, and Weber (2014), the first-
year spending multipliers calculated for European countries with the linear VAR frame-
work range from 0.3 (minimum) to 1.8 (maximum) whereas the median is 0.8.
6. Conclusion
The aim of this article is to compare the effects of government spending shock in three
CEE countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The analysis uses SVAR with
the identification scheme based on that of Blanchard and Perotti (2002). The results
indicate the positive response of output to the government spending shock. The base-
line model specification, including the same assumptions for each country, provides
peak multipliers (adjusted to be interpreted in the national currency) ranging from 0.2
in the Czech Republic to 1.8 in Poland. Generally, these multipliers for the Czech
Republic and Hungary correspond to the findings in the existing literature; however, in
the case of Poland the calculated peak value is much higher than 1.
In accordance with the results, it is important to emphasise some issues related to
the analysed models. The presented estimations are based on quite a short sample of
65 quarterly observations, moreover the three-variable system is employed. The length
of time series can affect the results, in that the calculated multipliers may be biased
(this problem is especially related to the multipliers calculated for the ‘turbulent
times’). Another comment concerns the elements of matrix A in the AB-representa-
tion. As presented, the estimations are based on partial elasticities derived from the
exogenous study. Also, the employed tax data are widely aggregated, and based on
the ESA2010 approach. Moreover, the calculation of the peak multipliers is based on
the mean of GDP to spending ratio over the analysed sample. Finally, as presented by
Caldara and Kamps (2012, 2017) for example, the results may be sensitive to the
identification scheme, or calculated elasticities. Moreover, the same VAR specification
is used in the case of each country. As indicated, with the same model specification,
the multipliers for Poland differ from these calculated for the Czech Republic and
Hungary, as well as those provided in the literature. The removal of the dummy
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variable for the crisis and post-crisis period decreased calculated peak multipliers for
Poland, however the multipliers are still higher than 1.
The employment of the robustness checks analysis cannot provide any substantial
differences between the calculations of the peak multiplier. However, estimated mod-
els indicate higher effectiveness of government spending shocks during the period of
economic crash. The analysed responsiveness of the output to the spending shock is
generally higher during the weak macroeconomic conditions.
The results indicate that in the analysed countries, the effective output stabilisation
is made possible by public investment and public consumption. As presented, the cal-
culation of the spending multiplier may to some extent be considered as robust to
the change in tax definition. The presented results may contribute to discussions
about the effectiveness of government spending stabilisation during these countries’
path to the eurozone. As presented, spending can be used as an effective stabilising
tool, as the calculated multipliers are close to 1 or even higher. The spending-based
expansionary policy seems to be effective in stimulating economy during the crisis
period. Moreover, the effects of spending in the Czech Republic and Hungary are
similar to those provided in the literature for the eurozone countries.
Notes
1. In this study the dummy variable is incorporated like in other studies on the subject.
However, when the dummy variable is incorporated only for the initial part of the crisis
(i.e. in 2008 and 2009), then the value of the calculated multiplier is lower for Poland and
higher in the cases of the Czech Republic and Hungary. The results are not reported here.
2. Although with a weaker quality of the residuals than in the cases of the Czech Republic
and Hungary.
3. The Hessian matrix was near to singular.
4. Due to the Hessian matrix was near to singular.
Acknowledgements





Afonso, A., & Silva Leal, F. (2018). Fiscal multipliers in the Eurozone: A SVAR analysis.
Working Papers REM 2018/47, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management.
Afonso, A., Baxa, J., & Slavik, M. (2018). Fiscal developments and financial stress: A threshold
VAR analysis. Empirical Economics, 54(2), 395–423. doi:10.1007/s00181-016-1210-5
Auerbach, A. J., & Gorodnichenko, Y. (2012). Measuring the output responses to fiscal policy.
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4(2), 1–27. doi:10.1257/pol.4.2.1
Baranowski, P., Krajewski, P., Mackiewicz, M., & Szymanska, A. (2016). The effectiveness of
fiscal policy over the business cycle: A CEE perspective. Emerging Markets Finance and
Trade, 52(8), 1910–1921. doi:10.1080/1540496X.2015.1046335
2910 A. SZYMANSKA
Batini, N., Callegari, G., & Melina, G. (2012). Successful austerity in the United States, Europe
and Japan. IMF Working Papers WP12/190doi:10.5089/9781475505382.001
Batini, N., Eyraud, L., & Weber, A. (2014). A simple method to compute fiscal multipliers.
IMF Working Papers no. WP/14/93doi:10.5089/9781498357999.001
Baum, A., & Koester, G. B. (2011). The impact of fiscal policy on economic activity over the
business cycle – Evidence from a threshold VAR analysis. Bundesbank Discussion Paper No.
3, Series 1, Deutsche Bundesbank.
Bencık, M. (2014). Dual regime fiscal multipliers in converging economies – A simple STVAR
approach. Narodna Banka Slovenska, Working Paper no. 2/2014.
Biau, O., & Girard, E. (2005). Politique budgetaire et dynamique economique en France:
L’approche VAR structurel. Economie Prevision, (3), 1–23.
Blanchard, O., & Perotti, R. (2002). An empirical characterization of the dynamic effects of
changes in government spending and taxes on output. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
117(4), 1329–1368. doi:10.1162/003355302320935043
Borg, I. (2014). Fiscal multipliers in Malta. Central Bank of Malta Working Paper no. WP/06/2014.
Burriel, P., De Castro, F., Garrote, D., Gordo, F., Paredes, J., & Perez, J. (2010). Fiscal policy
shocks in the Euro Area and the US: An empirical assessment. Fiscal Studies, 31(2),
251–285. doi:10.1111/j.1475-5890.2010.00114.x
Caldara, D., & Kamps, C. (2008). What are the effects of fiscal policy shocks? A VAR-based
comparative analysis. ECB Working Papers series no 877.
Caldara, D., & Kamps, C. (2012). The analytics of SVARs: A unified framework to measure fis-
cal multipliers. Washington, DC: Finance and Economics Discussion Series Divisions of
Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs Federal Reserve Board.
Caldara, D., & Kamps, C. (2017). The analytics of SVARs: A unified framework to measure fis-
cal multipliers. The Review of Economic Studies, 84(3), 1015–1040. doi:10.1093/restud/rdx030
Canova, F. (2007). Methods for applied macroeconomic research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Capek, J., & Crespo Cuaresma, J. (2018). We just estimated twenty million fiscal multipliers. Vienna
University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics Working Paper no. 268
Christiano, L. J., Eichenbaum, M., & Rebelo, S. (2011). When is the government spending
multiplier large? Journal of Political Economy, 119(1), 78–121. doi:10.1086/659312
Coenen, G., Erceg, C. J., Freedman, C., Furceri, D., Kumhof, M., Lalonde, R., … in’t Veld, J.
(2012). Effects of fiscal stimulus in structural models. American Economic Journal:
Macroeconomics, 4(1), 22–68. doi:10.1257/mac.4.1.22
Cogan, J. F., Cwik, T., Taylor, J. B., & Wieland, V. (2010). New Keynesian versus Old
Keynesian government spending multipliers. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 34
(3), 281–295. doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2010.01.010
Coric, T., Simovic, H., & Deskar-Skrbic, M. (2015). Monetary and fiscal policy mix in a small
open economy: The case of Croatia. Economic Research-Ekonomska Istrazivanja, 28(1),
407–421. doi:10.1080/1331677X.2015.1059073
Crespo Cuaresma, J., Eller, M., & Mehrotra, A. (2011). The economic transmission of fiscal
policy shocks from Western to Eastern Europe. BOFIT Discussion Papers, 12.
de Castro Fernandez, F., & Hernandez de Cos, P. (2006). The economic effects of exogenous fis-
cal shocks in Spain. A SVAR approach. EBC Working Paper Series No 647.
Deskar-Skrbic, M., Drezgic, S., & Simovic, H. (2018). Tax policy and labour market in Croatia:
Effects of tax wedge on employment. Economic Research-Ekonomska Istrazivanja, 31(1),
1218–1227. doi:10.1080/1331677X.2018.1456359
Deskar-Skribic, M., & Simovic, H. (2017). The effectiveness of fiscal spending in Croatia,
Slovenia and Serbia: The role of trade openness and public debt level. Post-Communist
Economies, 29(3), 336–358. doi:10.1080/14631377.2016.1267972
Eggertsson, G. (2011). What fiscal policy is effective at zero interest rates? NBER
Macroeconomics Annual, 25(1), 59–112. doi:10.1086/657529
Erceg, C., & Linde, J. (2014). Is there a fiscal free lunch in a liquidity trap? Journal of the
European Economic Association, 12(1), 73–107. doi:10.1111/jeea.12059
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA 2911
Fatas, A., & Mihov, I. (2001). The effects of fiscal policy on consumption and employment:
Theory and evidence, CEPR Discussion Papers, 2760.
Favero, C., & Giavazzi, F. (2012). Measuring tax multipliers: The narrative method in fiscal
VARs. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4(2), 69–94. doi:10.1257/pol.4.2.69
Forni, M., & Gambetti, L. (2016). Government spending shocks in open economy VARs.
Journal of International Economics, 99, 68–84. doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2015.11.010
Gechert, S., & Rannenberg, A. (2014). Are fiscal multipliers regime-dependent? A meta-regres-
sion analysis. IMK Working Paper No, 139.
Gechert, S. (2015). What fiscal policy is most effective? A meta-regression analysis. Oxford
Economic Papers, 67(3), 553–580. doi:10.1093/oep/gpv027
Giordano, R., Momigliano, S., Neri, S., & Perotti, R. (2007). The effects of fiscal policy in Italy:
Evidence from a VAR model. European Journal of Political Economy, 23(3), 707–733. doi:10.
1016/j.ejpoleco.2006.10.005
Grdovic Gnip, A. (2014). The power of fiscal multipliers in Croatia. Financial Theory and
Practice, 38(2), 173–219.
Hall, R. E. (2009). By how much does GDP rise if the government buys more output?
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2009(Fall), 183–231.
Haug, A., JeRdrzejowicz, T., & Sznajderska, A. (2013). Combining monetary and fiscal policy in
an SVAR for a small open economy. NBP Working Paper no. 168.
Hemming, R., Kell, M., & Mahfouz, S. (2002). The effectiveness of fiscal policy in stimulating
economic activity-a review of the literature. IMF Working Paper No. 02/208.
Hinic, B., & Miletic, M. (2013). Efficiency of the fiscal and monetary stimuli: The case of Serbia
(mimeo), National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje. http://www.nbrm.mk/
WBStorage/Files/WebBuilder_Mirjana_Miletic_Presentation_2ndNBRMConference.pdf.
Ilzetzki, E., Mendoza, E. G., & Vegh, C. A. (2013). How big (small?) Are fiscal multipliers?
Journal of Monetary Economics, 60(2), 239–254. doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2012.10.011
IMF. (2017). Structural Fiscal Balances. www.imf.org.
Kraay, A. (2014). Government spending multipliers in developing countries: Evidence from
lending by official creditors. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 6(4), 170–208.
doi:10.1257/mac.6.4.170
Lendvai, J. (2007). The impact of fiscal policy in Hungary. ECFIN Country Focus, 4(11), 1–6.
L€utkepohl, H. (2005). New introduction to multiple time series analysis. New York: Springer.
Mertens, K., & Ravn, M. O. (2012). Empirical evidence on the aggregate effects of anticipated
and unanticipated US tax policy shocks. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4(2),
145–181. doi:10.1257/pol.4.2.145
Mertens, K., & Ravn, M. O. (2014). A reconciliation of SVAR and narrative estimates of tax
multipliers. Journal of Monetary Economics, 68, S1–S19. doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2013.04.004
Mineshima, A., Poplawski-Ribeiro, M., & Weber, A. (2014). Size of fiscal multipliers. In
Cottarelli, C., Gerson, P., Senhadji, A., & Semlali, A. S. (Eds.), Post-crisis fiscal policy,
pp. 315–372. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Mirdala, R. (2009). Effects of fiscal policy shocks in the European transition economies.
Journal of Applied Research in Finance, 1(2), 141–155.
Mirdala, R., & Kamenik, M. (2017). Effects of fiscal policy shocks in CE3 countries (TVAR
approach). EþM Ekonomie a Management, 2, 46–64. doi:10.15240/tul/001/2017-2-004
Monacelli, T., & Perotti, R. (2008). Fiscal policy, wealth effects, and markups. NBER Working
Papers no. 14584, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Mountford, A., & Uhlig, H. (2009). What are the effects of fiscal policy shocks? Journal of
Applied Econometrics, 24(6), 960–992. doi:10.1002/jae.1079
Owyang, M. T., Ramey, V. A., & Zubairy, S. (2013). Are government spending multipliers
greater during periods of slack? Evidence from twentieth-century historical data. American
Economic Review, 103(3), 129–134. doi:10.1257/aer.103.3.129
Perotti, R. (2005). Estimating the effects of fiscal policy in OECD countries. CEPR Discussion
Paper No. 4842.
2912 A. SZYMANSKA
Ramey, V. A. (2011). Identifying government spending shocks: It’s all in the timing. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(1), 1–50. doi:10.1093/qje/qjq008
Ramey, V. A., & Shapiro, M. D. (1998). Costly capital reallocation and the effects of govern-
ment spending. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 48(1), 145–194. doi:
10.1016/S0167-2231(98)00020-7
Ramey, V. A., & Zubairy, S. (2018). Government spending multipliers in good times and in
bad: Evidence from US historical data. Journal of Political Economy, 126(2), 850–901. doi:10.
1086/696277
Ravnik, R., & Zilic, I. (2011). The use of SVAR analysis in determining the effects of fiscal
shocks in Croatia. Financial Theory and Practice, 35, 25–58.
Romer, C. D., & Romer, D. H. (2010). The macroeconomic effects of tax changes: Estimates
based on a new measure of fiscal shocks. American Economic Review, 100(3), 763–801. doi:
10.1257/aer.100.3.763
Sekuła, A., & Smiechowicz, J. (2016). Systems of general grants for local governments in
selected EU countries against the background of the general theory of fiscal policy.
Equilibrium, 11(4), 711–734. doi:10.12775/EQUIL.2016.032
Sz€orfi, B., & Toth, M. (2018). Measures of slack in the euro area. In ECB Economic Bulletin,
Issue 3, Box 3, 31–35.
Simovic, H. (2017). Impact of public debt (un)sustainability on fiscal policy effectiveness in
Croatia. EFZG Working Paper Series no. 17-05.
Simovic, H., & Deskar-Skrbic, M. (2013). Dynamic effects of fiscal policy and fiscal multipliers
in Croatia. Zbornik Radova Ekonomskog Fakulteta u Rijeci: casopis za Ekonomsku Teoriju i
Praksu, 31(1), 55–78.
Sims, C. (1980). Macroeconomics and reality. Econometrica, 48(1), 1–49. doi:10.2307/1912017
Sims, C., Stock, J., & Watson, M. W. (1990). Inference in linear time series models with some
unit roots. Econometrica, 58(1), 113–144. doi:10.2307/2938337
Spilimbergo, A., Symansky, S., & Schindler, M. (2009). Fiscal multipliers, IMF Staff Position
Note, no. SPN/09/11. doi:10.5089/9781462372737.004
Tenhofen, J., Wolff, G. B., & Heppke-Falk, K. H. (2010). The macroeconomic effects of
exogenous fiscal policy shocks in Germany: A disaggregated SVAR analysis. Jahrb€ucher f€ur
National€okonomie und Statistik, 230(3), 328–355.
Uhlig, H. (2005). What are the effects of monetary policy on output? Results from an agnostic
identification procedure. Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(2), 381–419.
Appendix
Table A1. Unit root test for variables (data in log).
Regression with trend and constant Regression with constant, without trend
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Czech Republic Hungary Poland
ADF Gt –2.7206 (0.2316) –2.8602 (0.1814) –1.1631 (0.9088) –2.2371 (0.1952) –2.8059 (0.0626) –1.7197 (0.4163)
Rt –4.7563 (0.0013) –2.3328 (0.4112) –2.2715 (0.4429) –1.5394 (0.5084) –0.8543 (0.7972) –1.2623 (0.6420)
Yt –1.5684 (0.7962) –1.8707 (0.6597) –1.6074 (0.7792) –1.1731 (0.6821) –1.3303 (0.6115) –0.9159 (0.7771)
DGt –13.8233 (0.0001) –2.2971 (0.4297) –3.8366 (0.0212) –13.8347 (0.0001) –2.2201 (0.2012) –3.5577 (0.0096)
DRt –14.2564 (0.0001) –8.5978 (0.0000) –5.4798 (0.0001) –14.3539 (0.0001) –8.6792 (0.0000) –5.5089 (0.0000)
DYt –5.6657 (0.0001) –4.8414 (0.0010) –9.2605 (0.0000) –5.6420 (0.0000) –4.8595 (0.0001) –9.2144 (0.0000)
PP Gt –3.6673 (0.0308) –2.0428 (0.5686) –1.1479 (0.9122) –1.3144 (0.6191) –1.9448 (0.3105) –1.6419 (0.4556)
Rt –4.9045 (0.0008) –6.7690 (0.0000) –2.1944 (0.4843) –2.0489 (0.2658) –2.7898 (0.0645) –1.2238 (0.6592)
Yt –1.6519 (0.7627) –1.9805 (0.6023) –1.6015 (0.7816) –1.3144 (0.6191) –1.7172 (0.4186) –0.9455 (0.7673)
DGt –19.9127 (0.0001) –9.5100 (0.0000) –8.6616 (0.0000) –17.0958 (0.0001) –9.5094 (0.0000) –8.5109 (0.0000)
DRt –20.1116 (0.0001) –21.7084 (0.0001) –9.1319 (0.0000) –20.4093 (0.0001) –23.3750 (0.0001) –9.2023 (0.0000)
DYt –5.8311 (0.0000) –4.7965 (0.0011) –9.1746 (0.0000) –5.8008 (0.0000) –4.8052 (0.0002) –9.1204 (0.0000)
Notes: p-values in brackets, ADF – Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, PP – Phillips–Perron test, D refers to the first
differences.
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Table A2. Lag length criteria for the baseline model.
0 1 2 3 4
AIC Czech Republic –8.696246 –12.01446 –11.97899 –11.89634 –11.85934
Hungary –9.128542 –12.03836 –11.94079 –11.73642 –11.82031
Poland –12.05529 –15.09811 –14.99771 –14.90429 –14.83318
SIC Czech Republic –8.395177 –11.41232 –11.07579 –10.69206 –10.35400
Hungary –8.827473 –11.43623 –11.03758 –10.53215 –10.31497
Poland –11.74385 –14.47523 –14.06339 –13.65853 –13.27598
HQC Czech Republic –8.577455 –11.77687 –11.62262 –11.42117 –11.26539
Hungary –9.009751 –11.80078 –11.58442 –11.26126 –11.22636
Poland –11.93324 –14.85400 –14.63154 –14.41606 –14.22290
Notes:  Denotes the lag order selected by the criterion, AIC – Akaike information criterion, SIC – Schwarz informa-
tion criterion, HQC – Hannan–Quinn information criterion.
Table A3. Elements of A and B matrices for the baseline model.
a4 a5 b1 b2 b4 b3 a6
Czech Republic 0.018 (0.529) –0.002 (0.894) 0.058 (0.000) 0.009 (0.000) 0.070 (0.000) 0.061 (0.000) 0.96
Hungary 0.044 (0.040) 0.002 (0.855) 0.042 (0.000) 0.007 (0.000) –0.016 (0.202) 0.099 (0.000) 0.98
Poland 0.230 (0.000) –0.012 (0.479) 0.016 (0.000) 0.007 (0.000) 0.013 (0.054) 0.054 (0.000) 1.15
Notes: p-values in brackets; a6 is exogenously-calculated average elasticity.
Table A4. Elements of A and B matrices – model with direct taxes, k¼ 1 lag.
a4 a5 b1 b2 b4 b3 a6
Czech Republic 0.021 (0.257) –0.004 (0.950) 0.059 (0.000) 0.009 (0.000) 0.001 (0.999) 0.019 (0.000) 0.27
Hungary 0.091 (0.009) –0.031 (0.127) 0.029 (0.000) 0.007 (0.000) 0.019 (0.001) 0.045 (0.000) 0.29
Poland       0.05
Notes: p-values in brackets; a6 is exogenously-calculated average elasticity. In the case of Poland, x denotes a lack of satisfactory models.
Table A5. Elements of A and B matrices – model with direct taxes, k¼ 4 lags.
a4 a5 b1 b2 b4 b3 a6
Czech Republic 0.015 (0.359) –0.007 (0.891) 0.062 (0.000) 0.008 (0.000) 0.001 (0.796) 0.019 (0.000) 0.27
Hungary 0.073 (0.066) –0.021 (0.298) 0.024 (0.000) 0.007 (0.000) 0.014 (0.018) 0.045 (0.000) 0.29
Poland 0.224 (0.000) 0.072 (0.035) 0.015 (0.000) 0.007 (0.000) 0.003 (0.350) 0.025 (0.000) 0.05
Notes: p-values in brackets; a6 is exogenously-calculated average elasticity.
Table A6. Elements of A and B matrices – model with indirect taxes, k¼ 1 lag.
a4 a5 b1 b2 b4 b3 a6
Czech Republic 0.026 (0.125) 0.101 (0.003) 0.059 (0.000) 0.009 (0.000) –0.003 (0.341) 0.029 (0.000) 0.34
Hungary 0.116 (0.001) 0.044 (0.050) 0.029 (0.000) 0.007 (0.000) –0.011 (0.037) 0.040 (0.000) 0.45
Poland 0.179 (0.001) 0.025 (0.124) 0.016 (0.000) 0.007 (0.000) 0.013 (0.036) 0.048 (0.000) 0.87
Notes: p-values in brackets; a6 is exogenously-calculated average elasticity.
Table A7. Elements of A and B matrices – model with indirect taxes, k¼ 4 lags.
a4 a5 b1 b2 b4 b3 a6
Czech Republic 0.024 (0.130) 0.098 (0.003) 0.062 (0.000) 0.008 (0.000) –0.004 (0.284) 0.029 (0.000) 0.34
Hungary       0.45
Poland 0.213 (0.001) 0.016 (0.369) 0.015 (0.000) 0.007 (0.000) 0.016 (0.007) 0.046 (0.000) 0.87
Notes: p-values in brackets; a6 is exogenously-calculated average elasticity. In the case of Hungary,  denotes a lack of satisfactory models.
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Table A8. Elements of A and B matrices – the baseline model with 4 lags.
a4 a5 b1 b2 b4 b3 a6
Czech Republic 0.012 (0.664) 0.001 (0.966) 0.063 (0.000) 0.008 (0.000) 0.076 (0.000) 0.055 (0.000) 0.96
Hungary 0.077 (0.025) –0.005 (0.583) 0.025 (0.000) 0.007 (0.000) –0.012 (0.316) 0.098 (0.000) 0.98
Poland 0.249 (0.001) –0.020 (0.249) 0.016 (0.000) 0.007 (0.000) 0.010 (0.159) 0.056 (0.000) 1.15
Notes: p-values in brackets; a6 is exogenously-calculated average elasticity.
Table A9. Elements of A and B matrices – subsample since 2007.
a4 a5 b1 b2 b4 b3 a6
Czech Republic       0.96
Hungary 0.166 (0.072) 0.006 (0.802) 0.027 (0.000) 0.009 (0.000) 0.037 (0.000) 0.061 (0.000) 0.98
Poland 0.235 (0.001) 0.016 (0.519) 0.017 (0.000) 0.007 (0.000) 0.005 (0.448) 0.043 (0.000) 1.15
Notes: p-values in brackets; a6 is exogenously-calculated average elasticity. In the case of the Czech Republic,  denotes a lack of satisfactory models.


















Czech Republic 0.1753 (3) 0.1719 (3) 0.2453 (6) 0.3429 (6) 0.2430 (6) 
Hungary 0.4529 (4) 0.8514 (7) 0.4602 (5)  0.6725 (3) 0.6774 (7)
Poland  1.8335 (7) 2.1727 (7) 2.2655 (7) 2.2880 (7) 1.0744 (1)
Notes:  Denotes significance based on the error bands; the quarter with the peak value is in brackets;  indicates
a lack of satisfactory models.
Table A11. Elements of A and B matrices, the additional SVAR specification for Poland.
a4 a5 b1 b2 b4 b3 a6
baseline model, k¼ 1 lag 0.206 (0.000) 0.009 (0.555) 0.016 (0.000) 0.007 (0.000) 0.013 (0.088) 0.059 (0.000) 1.15
baseline model, k¼ 4 lags 0.219 (0.001) 0.001 (0.988) 0.016 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.011 (0.166) 0.061 (0.000) 1.15
model with direct
taxes, k¼ 1 lag
0.184 (0.001) 0.091 (0.001) 0.016 (0.000) 0.007 (0.000) 0.003 (0.412) 0.034 (0.000) 0.05
model with direct
taxes, k¼ 4 lags
0.221 (0.000) 0.099 (0.001) 0.015 (0.000) 0.006 (0.000) 0.003 (0.337) 0.029 (0.000) 0.05
model with indirect
taxes, k¼ 1 lag
0.166 (0.002) 0.042 (0.008) 0.016 (0.000) 0.007 (0.000) 0.013 (0.045) 0.051 (0.000) 0.87
model with indirect
taxes, k¼ 4 lags
0.194 (0.002) 0.029 (0.096) 0.015 (0.000) 0.007 (0.000) 0.015 (0.010) 0.047 (0.000) 0.87
Notes: p-values in brackets; a6 is exogenously-calculated average elasticity.
CZECH REPUBLIC HUNGARY POLAND 
Figure A1. Inverse roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial for baseline model.
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Figure A3. Impulse responses of Y to structural one s.d. shock in G± 2 s.e., model with direct taxes,
k¼ 1 lag.
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Figure A5. Impulse responses of Y to structural one s.d. shock in G± 2 s.e., model with indirect
taxes, k¼ 1 lag.
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Figure A6. Impulse responses of Y to structural one s.d. shock in G± 2 s.e., model with indirect
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Figure A7. Impulse responses of Y to structural one s.d. shock in G± 2 s.e., baseline SVAR with
k¼ 4 lags.
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Figure A8. Impulse responses of Y to structural one s.d. shock in G± 2 s.e., subsample since 2007.
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Figure A9. Impulse responses of Y to structural one s.d. shock in G± 2 s.e. for Poland, SVAR specifi-
cations without the dummy variable for the crisis and post-crisis period.
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